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What Does Genocide Produce? The Semantic Field of Genocide, Cultural
Genocide, and Ethnocide in Indigenous Rights Discourse
Jeff Benvenuto

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Newark, NJ, USA
Abstract: The semantic field of genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnocide overlaps between Indigenous
rights discourse and genocide studies. Since the 1970s, such language has been used to express grievances
that have stimulated the construction of Indigenous rights in international law. These particular words
signify general concerns with the integrity of Indigenous peoples, thereby undergirding a larger framework of
normative beliefs, ethical arguments, and legal claims, especially the right to self-determination. Going back
to the post-World War II era, this article traces the normative and institutional processes through which this
overlapping discourse has emerged. Culminating with the adoption of the 2007 United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, this process of international lawmaking has critically challenged the
conventional interpretation of genocide, especially as the latter has been categorically distinguished from
cultural genocide or ethnocide.
Keywords: cultural genocide, ethnocide, human rights, non-governmental organizations
Introduction
What does the keyword genocide produce? What rhetorical purpose does it serve, especially in
making ethical arguments for rights? This article analyzes the political and moral functions and
meanings of genocide and its related terminology, especially as they have been used as part of
the vocabulary of Indigenous rights discourse. In particular, this type of language articulates
the common grievances of Indigenous peoples, who have survived centuries of pressure for
extermination, assimilation, and other forms of group destruction, and who in response have
also launched a global resurgence in recent decades. A transnational movement in the field of
Indigenous rights has fostered significant developments in the international system, as new norms
in the broader field of human rights have set the minimum standards for the survival, dignity, and
well-being of Indigenous peoples worldwide. The rhetoric of genocide has been partly instrumental
in this political process, going back to the origins of “Indigenous global politics” in the 1970s.1
This movement dates back to September 1977, when over 100 Indigenous delegations and 60
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), along with a few United Nations (UN) functionaries
and state government observers, met at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. They were
attending the International NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in
the Americas (hereafter, simply the 1977 NGO Conference).2 This event was a significant turning
point in the normative and institutional developments that eventually resulted in the adoption of
the 1989 International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 and the 2007 UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter, simply the 2007 Declaration). The latter is now the
cornerstone of the field of Indigenous rights, which took decades to transform into international
law. This process of international legalization was initially mobilized by a transnational advocacy
network that coalesced at the 1977 NGO Conference.3
The core of this advocacy network was strongly motivated by a collective sense of moral
indignation against the enduring injustices of colonialism. Such a sentiment was evident in
the “Declaration of Principles” adopted at the 1977 NGO Conference. Its preamble began by
acknowledging the activity of the UN in promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms,
while also “recognizing that conditions are imposed upon peoples that suppress, deny or destroy
the culture, societies or nations in which they believe or of which they are members.”4 This explicit
emphasis on the threats to Indigenous peoples provided a sense of urgency for the subsequent
enumeration of rights oriented around the principle of self-determination. Even though the specific
vocabulary of genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnocide were not actually used in the “Declaration
of Principles,” these were widely discussed keywords at the 1977 NGO Conference, where their
conventional meanings were fundamentally challenged as well.5
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For example, one delegate admitted to not being well versed in international law, but she
was nevertheless convinced that “in the limited dictionary of ordinary people everywhere in the
world there is no other word to describe it but genocide.”6 In this way, the term functioned as a
somewhat essentialized, short-hand expression used to emphatically draw attention to ongoing
threats to the physical and cultural integrity of Indigenous peoples. Such a construal implied the
moral equivalence between the attempted biological-physical and socio-cultural destruction of a
group, respectively. In this way, the 1977 NGO Conference participants collapsed a categorical
distinction in the international legal canon of genocide, foreshadowing the contemporary debate
over the role of cultural genocide in recent cases.7
Nevertheless, the conference participants acknowledged the definitional limitations of the
1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UNGC), which categorically distinguished the strictly legal meaning of genocide from the related
notions of cultural genocide and ethnocide.8 Faced with this conceptual impasse, one of the conference’s
organized sub-bodies, the Social and Cultural Commission, resolved that “ethnocide must be
defined as both a cause and a part of genocide.”9 By collapsing this distinction, the 1977 NGO
Conference attempted to open up a new way to approach peoples’ fundamental right to exist. Using
this historical vignette as a point of departure, the following analysis argues that the semantic field
of genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnocide has not only stimulated the production of Indigenous
rights in international law, but that Indigenous rights discourse has also opened up new ways of
understanding the inherent connections between these associated keywords.
Between Indigenous Rights and Genocide Studies
The close conceptual pairing in Indigenous rights discourse of genocide, on the one hand, and cultural
genocide or ethnocide, on the other, foreshadowed the recent colonial turn in genocide studies. Since
the early 2000s, a more Lemkinian approach has returned to the field in conjunction with emerging
scholarship on settler colonialism.10 Such work has been directed towards what Patrick Wolfe calls
the “logic of elimination,” referring to a certain structural tendency of settler colonial formations
that sometimes converges with genocide but is otherwise distinct. This conceptualization enables
Wolfe to “regard assimilation as itself a form of destruction” without having to make the case
for genocide, per se, while also avoiding what he sees as the awkwardness of the term cultural
genocide.11 Other scholars, like Damien Short, go further in suggesting the possibility that forcible
assimilation is a sufficient condition for genocide, while Dirk Moses represents a more moderate
position, contending that cultural destruction must be accompanied by physical and biological
attacks in order to qualify as genocide.12 Even within the colonial genocide studies literature, then,
there is disagreement as to how forced assimilation and cultural destruction fit into the conceptual
framework of the field. Nevertheless, this scholarship has pushed towards a conception of genocide
as a form of group destruction rather than simply the mass murder of individuals.13 This way of
thinking corresponds to many of the arguments and assumptions in Indigenous rights discourse.
Between indigenous rights discourse and genocide studies are a number of important
connections that can be made with other relevant research programs. The 1977 NGO Conference
especially fits into the alternative historiography of human rights exemplified by the works of
Samuel Moyn and Jan Eckel. They critique the basic idea of human rights as a specifically postWorld War II phenomenon and instead argue that the norms and institutions crafted during the
1940s were at first stillborn with the Great Power politics involved with the creation of the UN, as
well as with the subsequent arrival of the Cold War and decolonization, only to suddenly flourish
in the 1970s, just as the global Indigenous rights movement began to rise. Moyn even stresses
that 1977, the same year as the NGO Conference, was more generally the “breakthrough year”
in the history of human rights, given the inauguration of American President Jimmy Carter and
the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International.14 While such historiography has
yet to pay much attention to Indigenous peoples,15 anthropologists have observed and sometimes
even participated as advocates in the process of transforming Indigenous rights into international
law. Moreover, ethnographic methods have demonstrated the ways in which global discourses of
human/indigenous rights are appropriated and translated through social practices from various
localities around the world.16 Finally, the significance of Indigenous rights discourse can also be
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explained across the even more general field of constructivism in international relations theory,
considering an array of relevant concepts like transnational advocacy networks, non-state actors,
global civil society, international norms, state compliance, and domestic change.17
A common pattern identified throughout this various scholarship concerns how normative
beliefs and ethical arguments are used as political resources to critique status quo relations.
In genocide studies, for example, Moses brings attention to the affective dimension of genocide
as a keyword, especially as it has been used to express “the traumatic consciousness of group
subjugation or destruction,” while other scholars demonstrate how charges of genocide are tied
to political claims for self-determination.18 From Indigenous studies, meanwhile, Ronald Niezen
refers to “the politics of indignation” to describe how targeted groups attempt to gain empathy
and possibly influence public opinion by appropriating the images, narratives, and frames that
signify their social suffering.19 He extends this idea to his ethnographic study of the Canadian
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where he argues that the expression of rights-based claims
against perceived injustices have become a source of collective meaning and identity. This type of
analysis, he says, is “as much concerned with the socially constructive power of rights as with the
destructive power of wrongs.”20
Following such insights, this article is concerned with what the semantic field of genocide,
cultural genocide, and ethnocide has to offer advocates of Indigenous rights. Whereas another scholar
recently asked, “what do genocides kill?,”21 I instead wonder, “what does genocide produce?”22 By
employing italicized text for these keywords, I am drawing attention to the rhetorical and political
effects of this type of language in expressing certain normative beliefs and ethical arguments that
are used to help make the case for Indigenous rights. This rhetorical approach is concerned with
genocide and its related keywords as means of persuasion and is not meant to suggest that such
claims are unduly exaggerated or bombastic. With this in mind, I will explain how the conventional
meaning of genocide in international law been challenged by Indigenous rights discourse. At the
same time, I will demonstrate how the semantic field surrounding this keyword has been used to
help construct Indigenous rights discourse in the first place.
Genocide and Integration in Post-World War II International Law
In order to see the political and institutional changes in Indigenous rights discourse after the
1970s, prior historical context is necessary to first understand how colonial beliefs and practices
regarding Indigenous peoples were perpetuated in the post-World War II era. There is already a
rich body of scholarship on the creation of the UNGC, with particular attention on the diplomatic
wrangling involved with the removal of cultural genocide from the final text.23 By juxtaposing the
1948 UNGC with the 1951 ILO Convention No. 107 (the Convention concerning the Protection
and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent
Countries), the following critical analysis will examine some of the background assumptions,
biases, and blindspots operating within the international institutions of the time.24 Both of these
instruments failed to protect Indigenous peoples from forcible assimilation and group destruction.
Rather, they both appear to have been created under the assumption that sovereign states were
obliged to integrate these stigmatized populations into dominant national units.
Such a colonialist assumption was apparent with two of the most well-known arguments
against the inclusion of cultural genocide in the UNGC. The first was that the practices of
assimilation and integration typically connoted by cultural genocide or ethnocide did not meet the
legal requirement of genocidal intent. According to this definitional standard, as determined
by the expert panel behind the 1947 Secretariat draft, “certain acts which may result in the total
or partial destruction of a group of human beings are in principle excluded from the notion of
genocide, namely … the policy of compulsory assimilation of a national element.”25 Even Raphael
Lemkin agreed that “cultural genocide was much more than just a policy of forced assimilation by
moderate coercion.”26 Elsewhere he suggested that, “when exposed to strong outside influences,”
the continued existence of certain groups depended on “cultural diffusion,” even if “it may lead to
the eventual disintegration of a weak culture.”27 The misconception that Indigenous peoples were
somehow anemic and destined to vanish thus informed the argument that forced assimilation was
not genocidal due to its general lack of specific intent.
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The second argument against the inclusion of cultural genocide from the final text of the
UNGC was more of a departure from Lemkin’s thought, however. As discussed elsewhere,
Lemkin understood the “genos” of genocide in group-oriented terms that harkened back to Johann
Gottfried Herder and the intellectual legacy of romanticism in Central Eastern Europe.28 This type
of intellectual orientation towards group rights was more prevalent during the previous interwar
period, when it was misappropriated by fascist and other right-wing organic nationalists. Of
course, the minority rights regime of the League of Nations ended in catastrophic failure, and with
the postwar creation of the UN, there was a major normative shift towards the universal human
rights of individuals. In this context, Lemkin’s thinking about group rights was outdated, and his
conception of genocide that included cultural destruction was flatly rejected by certain member
states.29 In General Assembly deliberations over the final text of the UNGC, for example, the United
States delegate suggested that the notion of group rights underpinning the idea of cultural genocide
was moot so long as individual rights were assured.30
With such conceptual blinders in place, the topic of Indigenous peoples was hardly discussed
while drafting the UNGC. The few times it was mentioned, it was typically framed in terms of a
social evolutionary paradigm that still retained intellectual force after World War II, despite the
ostensible delegitimization of scientific racism. For example, the Brazilian delegate suggested that,
“given the historical evolution of civilizations, a State might be justified in its endeavor to achieve
by legal means a certain degree of homogeneity and culture within its boundaries.”31 Under this
pretext, Indigenous peoples were deemed to be legitimate targets for socioeconomic and cultural
integration into dominant national units. This attitude was further evident with the Venezuelan
representative, who had otherwise supported the inclusion of cultural genocide, at least in a limited
form. But the transfer of children, he said in reference to what would become Article II (e) of the
final draft, “might be made from a group with a low standard of civilization and living in conditions
both unhealthy and primitive, to a highly civilized group as members of which the children would
suffer no physical harm and would indeed enjoy an existence which was materially better.”32 He
was thus concerned that this provision would fundamentally undermine the presumed legitimacy
of state integrationist policies.
In the historical context of the postwar transformation of the international system, this type of
colonial belief and practice of integration was apparent throughout the world. Even as European
empires were being dismantled, the colonization of Indigenous peoples continued unabated.
The official process of decolonization was strictly limited to “non-self-governing territories” that
were geographically separated from imperial metropoles, and the so-called “salt-water thesis” of
decolonization effectively legitimized the “internal colonialism” experienced by Indigenous peoples
and their territories.33 In this context, as developmentalism and other theories of modernization
began to globally disseminate by the 1950s, integration became an important keyword in the
social engineering of modern economies, states, and nations.34 In his analysis of the ILO regime
and Indigenous peoples, Luis Rodríguez-Piñero has demonstrated how central this integrative
approach was to ILO Convention No. 107.35
The International Labour Organization was first established in 1919 as a principle organ of
the League of Nations, the latter of which was dedicated to, among other things, what it called “a
sacred trust of civilization.”36 In the vein of reforming colonial policies, the ILO began studying the
conditions of “Indigenous workers” in certain parts of the world during the interwar period. By
the 1940s, the ILO began responding to a growing normative shift across the Americas known as
indigenismo. According to a recent study of this diverse political, economic, and cultural movement,
indigenismo “celebrated indigenous people and their traditions, on the one hand, but usually also
called for their modernization, assimilation, and ‘improvement,’ on the other.” 37 This intellectual
current effectively reframed the so-called “Indian problem” into a public policy issue concerned
with addressing the poor socioeconomic status of Indigenous populations, and it was from this
perspective that the ILO formulated the first international standards dedicated to Indigenous
peoples.
ILO Convention No. 107 was thus conceived under the basic assumptions that “tribal or semitribal populations” were at a “less advanced stage” of development, and that “Governments shall
have the primary responsibility for developing coordinated and systematic action for the protection
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of the populations concerned and their progressive integration into the life of their respective
countries.”38 Pursuant to this ostensibly benevolent pretense, the protocol mostly enumerated a
number of duties for states, although a few rights were granted to Indigenous peoples, such as the
right to maintain customary laws and institutions.39 On the surface, then, ILO Convention No. 107
provided at least some measure of protection for the physical and cultural existence of Indigenous
peoples, although such recognition was only temporary, insofar as it was expected to ease the
process of integration. In the end, ILO Convention No. 107 was only ratified by a mere 27 countries,
the majority of which were from the Americas,40 although it nevertheless epitomized a more global
trend at the time concerning the integration of Indigenous peoples as part of the larger ideological
framework of modernization.
A Normative Shift After the 1970s
As elaborated below, ILO Convention No. 107 was replaced in 1989 by ILO Convention No. 169.
In the three-decade-long period between these two instruments, there was a major normative
shift away from an emphasis on state integrationist policies in favor of a rights-based sensibility
constructed around the principle of self-determination.41 This transformation was underway during
the 1970s and 1980s, when developments in the human rights agenda at the UN led to a partial
overlap between Indigenous rights discourse and genocide studies and prevention. In particular,
there was dialogue between two Special Rapporteurs assigned by the UN Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (hereafter, simply the Sub-Commission).42
During its 24th session in August 1971, the Sub-Commission assigned Nicodème Ruhashyankiko
to prepare a report on the prevention and punishment of genocide, which he completed in 1978
(this was followed by a second genocide report by Benjamin Whitaker in 1985). The same session of
the Sub-Commission also authorized José Martínez Cobo, who released his monumental study on
Indigenous peoples in piecemeal from 1981 to 1983. These experts were independently tasked with
reviewing relevant scholarship, case law, official documentation, and government responses to
requests for information in order to prepare reports for the UN Commission on Human Rights, of
which the Sub-Commission was a subordinate body. Although they were undertaken as separate
endeavors, these two sets of reports indicate an overlapping concern with situating the concepts of
cultural genocide and ethnocide in relation to the prevention and punishment of genocide.
An examination of some of the footnotes in the two Sub-Commission reports on genocide – the
first by Ruhashyankiko in the 1970s and the second by Whitaker during the 1980s – suggests that
new meanings of cultural genocide and ethnocide were being produced at the time. For example,
Ruhashyankiko cited the French ethnographer Robert Jaulin, who essentially recoined to idea of
ethnocide to pose as an alternative to the UNGC.43 Following his fieldwork in Latin America during
the 1960s, Jaulin used the concept of ethnocide to describe what he considered to be the predatory
impulse of Western civilization in consuming and destroying the world’s cultural diversity. He
implied that this type of group destruction was conceptually distinguishable from intentional
physical annihilation, and in this vein, he tacitly maintained the conventional rendering of genocide
as categorically distinct from ethnocide. Nevertheless, his usage of ethnocide was revolutionary,
insofar as it implied a moral equivalence to genocide, per se.44 To be clear, Ruhashyankiko was
not endorsing this particular point in his Sub-Commission report, but the fact that he cited Jaulin
nevertheless indicates that alternative approaches were beginning to surface.
For entirely unrelated reasons, the publication of the Ruhashyankiko report was soon
shrouded in controversy, and by 1982 the Sub-Commission authorized Benjamin Whitaker to
prepare a revised and updated report on genocide, the footnotes of which also indicate changes
in Indigenous rights discourse.45 For example, Whitaker referenced a 1976 edited volume by the
international legal scholar Richard Arens, who was instrumental in bringing attention to the
case of the Aché people in Paraguay.46 During the 1970s, the Aché had become a minor cause
célèbre, especially among Western European and American anthropologists doing fieldwork in
Latin America. Operating through newly created NGOs like the International Work Group on
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), a network of scholars and advocates began using the term genocide to
raise global awareness of the Aché. This language was often used self-evidently, as if it was without
question a natural descriptor of the situation. Such loose rhetoric became the source of a heated
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controversy among non-Indigenous activists.47 That this semantic debate even occurred, however,
indicates that genocide was becoming conceptually unmoored from its legalistic constraints, and
was instead being communicated on an affective level. This was evident in the epilogue of Arens’
volume, which was authored by Elie Wiesel, the famous Holocaust survivor who rescinded his
belief in the uniqueness of the Shoah, at least in this case.48 While it is important not to overstate
the significance of such footnotes in the respective genocide reports for the Sub-Commission, this
evidence suggests that intellectual changes were underway.
This normative shift is further apparent with the brief dialogue between the two SubCommission reports on genocide, on the one hand, and the “Study of the Problem of Discrimination
against Indigenous Populations” by Special Rapporteur Cobo, on the other. Most well-known for its
influential attempt to define “Indigenous peoples,”49 the Cobo report was comprehensive in scope
and was very important in informing ongoing deliberations elsewhere in the Sub-Commission
regarding the development of Indigenous rights. In this regard, Cobo’s brief discussion of
genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnocide was used in the context of discussing the particular right of
Indigenous peoples to protect, maintain, and develop their own customs and institutions. Drawing
from Ruhashyankiko’s review of the definitional debate surrounding the UNGC, Cobo concluded
that “the question whether ethnocide is or is not a form of genocide is important, but however it
is decided the fact remains that ethnocide consists of a series of serious violations of human rights
which resemble genocide and which must be forestalled and punished.”50 In identifying a lacuna
surrounding this concept in international law, the Cobo report in turn prompted the subsequent
Whitaker to reconsider the possibilities of bringing cultural genocide or ethnocide back into the
definitional fold of the international law against genocide.51 This dialogue between Cobo and
the two Sub-Commission reports on genocide not only indicates the relevance of this particular
semantic field in the construction of Indigenous rights, but also that Indigenous rights discourse
was also instigating conceptual changes in the field of genocide studies and prevention.
This was further evident with the Declaration of San José produced by the 1981 UNESCO
Conference on Ethnocide and Ethnodevelopment. Although this meeting had no official capacity
to promulgate international law, it nevertheless provided a formal setting to propose working
standards that would subsequently mature with the drafting of the 2007 Declaration. In this fashion,
the 1981 Declaration of San José defined ethnocide as the denial of an ethnic group’s “right to enjoy,
develop and transmit its own culture and its own language, whether collectively or individually,”
adding that, for transgressing the right to culture, it should be considered “a violation of
international law equivalent to genocide”.52 In order to prevent and repair this particular offense,
the concept of ethnodevelopment was proposed in order to promote “the independent decisionmaking capacity of a culturally distinct society to direct its own development and exercise of selfdetermination, at whatever level.”53 As such, the conceptual structure of the 1981 Declaration of
San José shows ethnocide was used in Indigenous rights discourse to signify the need for a new type
of international legal prohibition specifically tailored to support a more positive and prescriptive
set of rights associated with the principle of self-determination.
By the 1980s, these various developments marked a profound shift in Indigenous rights
discourse from an emphasis on integration to self-determination. As noted, this shift was so
profound that ILO Convention No. 107 was eventually replaced altogether in 1989 with a new
protocol, ILO Convention No. 169, otherwise known as the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention. Although the semantic field of genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnocide was not
specifically covered in ILO Convention No. 169, its preamble tacitly alluded to the general spirit of
these concepts, especially as it denounced “the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards.”
Instead, ILO Convention No. 169 recognized “the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control
over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop
their identities, languages and religions, within the framework of the States in which they live.”54
As explained below, the fact that the specific language of self-determination was carefully avoided
here indicates that there were limits to the normative shift of Indigenous rights. Nevertheless, the
preceding analysis suggests that the transnational advocacy network of Indigenous rights was
largely able to set the terms of subsequent debates that eventually culminated with the adoption
of the 2007 Declaration.
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Contested Limits and Boundaries Since the 1980s
Despite evidencing a normative shift away from previous standards, ILO Convention No. 169 still
imposed certain boundaries on Indigenous rights. Indeed, the keyword “peoples” as part of the very
title of ILO Convention No. 169 was strongly contested by state governments that were suspicious
of the term’s associations with self-determination and secessionist claims. They generally preferred
to instead retain the specific language of “populations” from the title of ILO Convention No. 107,
given its domesticating connotations. Ultimately, an unequal compromise was reached when the
use of the term “peoples” was strictly limited in a way that “shall not be construed as having
any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law.”55 A
similar safeguard was eventually built into the final text of the 2007 Declaration, which concluded
by assuring that “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of
the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States.”56 Despite their many differences in form, content, and legal status, both ILO Convention
No. 169 of 1989 and the 2007 Declaration similarly limit the meaning of Indigenous rights in the
traditionally state-centric international system.
Yet unlike the creation of ILO Convention No. 169, in which Indigenous organizations and
advocates were unable to directly participate,57 this transnational advocacy network enjoyed a
more proactive role in the origins of the 2007 Declaration. This dates back to 1982, when the SubCommission established a Working Group on Indigenous Populations (hereafter referred to as
the Sub-Commission Working Group), which was mandated to review pertinent developments
in human rights with special attention to “the evolution of standards” concerning Indigenous
peoples.58 Its exceptional participation policy did not require formal consultative status with the UN
in order for Indigenous representatives to partake, and this enabled the Sub-Commission to grow in
size and stature. By the end of the decade, its sessions were drawing over 1,000 participants, giving
this body a high profile despite its relatively low level in the UN organization.59 These conditions
enabled some participants to push the limits of the Sub-Commission Working Group’s mandate
by “naming and shaming” certain states accused of political violence and genocidal practices. One
close observer noted that the Sub-Commission Working Group turned into “a forum for airing
grievances.”60 Under such circumstances, however, the long-standing Chairperson-Rapporteur of
the Sub-Commission Working Group, Erica-Irene Daes, did her best to ensure that this forum did
not devolve into a “chamber of complaints,”61 and that such charges would instead add a sense
of urgency to their work in developing a first draft to what would eventually become the 2007
Declaration.
In finalizing this first draft (hereafter referred to as the 1994 draft),62 the Sub-Commission
Working Group promoted new meanings for genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnocide. Given
their unparalleled access to the Sub-Commission Working Group, Indigenous organizations and
advocates were influential in setting the terms for the remainder of the drafting process, and
the 1994 draft is considered by some observers to be the most progressive version of Indigenous
rights.63 However, the form and content of the 1994 draft was altered as it subsequently moved up
the UN system. In 1995, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) created a new working group
(hereafter referred to as the CHR Working Group) which, unlike its predecessor, was primarily
comprised of member state delegations. Indigenous organizations and advocates struggled to
retain the influence they had previously enjoyed, and in turn they protested their marginalization,
walking out of the 1996 session and going on hunger strike in 2004.64 In this context, the CHR
Working Group prepared what is referred to as the 2006 draft, in which revisions were made
without the consent of Indigenous participants. A third and final round of revisions was then made
by the General Assembly before it ultimately adopted the 2007 Declaration. A comparison of these
three texts indicates that state-imposed limits to Indigenous rights discourse also restrained the
extent to which new meanings of genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnocide were promoted.
To begin with, the Sub-Commission Working Group operated under the premise that
existing human rights standards were insufficient, and that certain adaptations and innovations
were needed in order to meet the needs and aspirations of Indigenous peoples. In some cases,
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already existent standards were tweaked, as with Article 6 of the 1994 draft, which concerned
genocide. As originally established by the UNGC, the conventional emphasis of genocide was on
the individual right to life and physical integrity, but Article 6 of the 1994 draft deemphasized this
individualist interpretation. Instead, it identified genocide65 It is worth noting that, despite already
being included in the international law of genocide, forcible child removal was singled out here
for special attention, as this had become a global pattern of genocide against Indigenous peoples.
Whereas Article 6 of the 1994 draft was a modification of an already existent norm, Article
7 promoted the conceptual duo of cultural genocide and ethnocide as an entirely new standard in
international law. Article 7 thus began by declaring that “Indigenous peoples have the collective
and individual right not to be subjected to ethnocide and cultural genocide,” which it described
as the deprivation of cultural values and ethnic identities, the dispossession of lands, territories,
and resources, as well as “any form of assimilation or integration by other cultures or ways of life
imposed on them by legislative, administrative or other measures.”66 There was some confusion,
however, as to the precise relationship between the concepts of cultural genocide and ethnocide. This
lack of clarity was raised by the Language Services of the United Nations, which reviewed the 1994
draft before it proceeded to the CHR. Following the reasoning of Chairperson-Rapporteur Daes,
the Language Services report concluded “that ‘cultural genocide’ referred to the destruction of
the physical aspects of a culture, while ‘ethnocide’ referred to the elimination of an entire ‘ethnos’
or people.”67 No further elaboration of this distinction appears in the records, and the question
remains as to how “the physical aspects of a culture” is understood separately from its so-called
“ethnos.” Taking advantage of this conceptual confusion, some member states, especially Canada,
Chile, and the United States, were immediately critical of this particular provision in the 1994
draft.68
Indeed, as the second phase of the drafting process began with the CHR Working Group
in 1995, the influence of member states increased vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples. In this setting of
unequal power relations, some of the colonial assumptions analyzed above with regards to the
drafting of the UNGC resurfaced a half-century later in the context of Indigenous rights discourse.
For example, some states were concerned with the 1994 draft’s absolute prohibition against
Indigenous child removal. According to the records from the first session of the CHR Working
Group:
With regard to article 6, several Governments expressed the difficulties they had with the
phrase “under any pretext” as contained in its first paragraph. They stated that there were
circumstances under which it was in the child’s interest to be removed from their families
and communities, whether the child was indigenous or non-indigenous. It was felt that in
these circumstances indigenous people and communities should not receive preferential
treatment over others since this could turn out to be harmful to the child.69

Although the particular emphasis on the forcible removal of children originally established in
Article 6 of the 1994 draft was ultimately retained in what became Article 7 of the 2006 draft (note
that the numbering of the articles was altered in the process), it appears that member states were
committed to limiting the meaning of this provision.
Accordingly, Article 7 of the 2006 draft reversed the syntax from what was originally Article
6 in the 1994 version. The new text established by the CHR Working Group emphasized that
the prohibition of genocide was first and foremost a guarantee of the individual right to life and
physical integrity. Only then did the revised text acknowledge that genocide also covered “the
collective right to live … as distinct peoples.”70 Moreover, whereas this provision the 1994 draft was
more rigorous in providing “full guarantees against genocide,” the 2006 draft merely stated that
Indigenous peoples “shall not be subject to any act of genocide.”71 Equally subtle yet significant
changes were also apparent in Article 8 of the 2006 draft (formerly Article 7 of the 1994 draft), the
revised text of which began by declaring that “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right
not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.”72 Removed was the earlier
qualification that this was both a collective and individual right. More significantly, however, this
second draft prepared by CHR Working Group deleted the specific language of cultural genocide
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and ethnocide, which were instead replaced by more generic descriptors. It thus seems that these
terms were too controversial and imprecise, even though their general spirit was retained.
When the 2006 draft was delivered to the Third Committee of the General Assembly (GA) for
final approval, important textual changes were made in order to reaffirm the sovereign authority of
state governments over Indigenous peoples. Almost immediately, a bloc of African states protested
that the proposed right to self-determination would lead to secessionist movements. With the
support of the CANZUS countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States), the
African bloc moved to defer the final vote until the inviolability of state sovereignty was explicitly
guaranteed in order to limit the extent of Indigenous rights.73 Following this, the provision against
forced assimilation and cultural destruction was slightly amended and diminished in this third
and final round of revisions. Article 8(2)(d) of the 2006 draft retained the original language from
the 1994 version, which prohibited “any form of forced assimilation by other cultures or ways of
life imposed on them by legislative, administrative or other measures.” However, the final text of
the 2007 Declaration deleted reference to “legislative, administrative or other measures,” thereby
effectively taking the onus of off the state as a primary agent of such transgressions.74 This was just
one of several last-minute revisions that ultimately reaffirmed the sovereign authority of states and
restrained the claims for Indigenous rights.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis demonstrates the imposition of structural and discursive boundaries in
the development of Indigenous rights. Despite the fact that the transnational advocacy network of
Indigenous rights may have provided the initial inspiration for ILO Convention No. 169 and the
2007 Declaration, it is also true that state governments retained the final authority in formalizing
these processes of international lawmaking. With these instruments’ subsequent and ongoing
processes of domestic compliance, moreover, the acquiescence of state governments is ultimately
necessary in order to ensure their implementation and enforcement. Indeed, the very act of defining
state obligations in regards to the international legalization of Indigenous rights has effectively
reinforced the superior sovereign status of nation states over the autonomy of Indigenous peoples.75
This reflects the underlying structuring of the international system, which despite promises since
the post-World War II era to shift the focus of international law from states to people, nevertheless
remains fundamentally state-centric.
In addition to these structural limitations, there have also been discursive constraints in the
process of translating Indigenous peoples’ claims into the idioms of international law. Despite the
ostensibly progressive appeal of human rights discourse, this broad field is still troubled by its
association with Eurocentric and colonial tendencies to marginalize the many alternative ways of
being, thinking, and doing represented by the world’s Indigenous peoples.76 Irene Watson argues
that, “instead of protecting Aboriginal peoples, ‘human rights’ bring to order our regulation and
containment. That is because the keepers of power determine the questions of humanity and that
which constitutes the rights of humans, and they are ultimately positioned to enable or disable
humanity.”77 It is thus reasonable to be critical of the international legal and political discourses
associated with universal human rights, as well as to appreciate how Indigenous claims are
premised upon their own unique sources of power and legitimacy.78
Yet despite the possibility that rights discourse in global affairs is reproducing colonial
relations of power, it is also apparent that important changes in international law have been
advanced nevertheless. For example, James Anaya demonstrates how Indigenous rights discourse
has contributed to a newer and more flexible set of meanings for self-determination, which is no
longer strictly defined by the achievement of independent statehood, but rather by the recognition
of and respect for Indigenous peoples as self-governing entities entitled to fully participate in the
decisions affecting their lives. This general principle undergirds an assorted array of more specific
norms, including the right to cultural integrity, which has also fruitfully developed in the field of
human rights as a result of Indigenous rights discourse.79 Articles 7 and 8 of the 2007 Declaration
are thus an extension of this broader development behind the cultural integrity norm, and it is in
this context that the semantic field of genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnocide is significant. It is not
the case that such rhetoric has simply been used as “strategic weapons” in political movements
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for secession.80 Rather, these keywords signify a general concern with protecting the continued
existence of Indigenous peoples as a crucial element in a larger framework of rights.81
As a result of the normative and institutional developments behind the construction of
Indigenous rights, new meanings for the semantic field of genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnocide
have been produced. The conventional interpretation established by the UNGC, whereby genocide
was categorically distinguished from cultural genocide and ethnocide, has been critically challenged.
More assertive versions of Indigenous rights discourse, as with the 1977 NGO Conference,
for example, underscore the intrinsic connections across this semantic field, suggesting that
“ethnocide must be defined as both a cause and a part of genocide,” and that there should be a legal
equivalence between the two.82 The more moderate version established by the 2007 Declaration
merely juxtaposes genocide alongside the apparently synonymous concepts of cultural genocide
and ethnocide. Although the latter pair represents a new international legal norm with a relatively
“softer” status, at least compared with the international customary law against genocide,83 the
juxtaposition of these two provisions in the 2007 Declaration suggests at least a moral equivalence
between the physical and cultural destruction of a group.
In conclusion, the field of genocide studies should embrace the ongoing dialogue with
Indigenous rights discourse and its associated field of Indigenous studies. This intellectual exchange
dates back to the 1970s, and it continues with the contemporary flourishing of the colonial genocide
studies literature. The recent emergence of a nascent approach referred to as “decolonizing genocide
studies,” which attempts to destabilize some of the foundational assumptions and biases of the field
in order to open space for Indigenous ways of knowing, has furthered this dialogue.84 Not only
does this new approach promise epistemological insights into the nature of genocide as a broad
category of group destruction, but it also poses important methodological and ethical challenges
regarding the legal and political implications of genocide studies. Indeed, as the semantic field of
genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnocide continues to be deployed by the transnational advocacy
network for Indigenous rights, genocide scholars must revisit our field’s perennial concern with
the balance between scholarship and activism.
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